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“The ‘Digression’ in Plato’s Theaetetus:
A New Interpretation”
David Levy
University of Rochester
I
take it that one of Plato’s goals in the Theaetetus is to point out exactly what is
wrong with the following Protagorean doctrine:
Man is the measure of all things—alike of the being of things that
are and of the not-being of things that are not (152A).1
Indeed, this task occupies the largest single section of the dialogue; the discussion of the
Protagorean doctrine takes up the better part of 27 Stephanus pages, beginning at 152A,
and continuing through 179D. That this is so should initially surprise the reader of the
dialogues. Hadn’t Protagoras already received his due in the dialogue named for him?
And why should Protagoras, or at least his teachings, play so central a role in a dialogue
concerned with finding a definition of knowledge, when Protagoras himself, a sophist,
was primarily concerned with teaching his students to be better at the game of politics?
In this paper, I propose that answers to these questions are found in Socrates’
“digression” at Tht. 172D-177C. As will become clear, the digression primarily takes up
political themes, which again should leave the reader wondering about its placement in a
dialogue concerning epistemology. It is my contention that Plato believed these themes
to be intimately bound up with Protagoras’s doctrine, and that his comments on these
themes are an integral part of his critique of that doctrine.2 In arguing for my position, I
do not intend to take up the question of whether or not Plato succeeds in refitting die
Protagorean doctrine. Rather, I believe that the literature which focuses on that question
is deficient for its failure to pay sufficient attention to the digression. After briefly
reviewing this literature, I will offer an interpretation of the digression which makes clear
its relationship to Plato’s overall critique of Protagoras.
Before turning to the literature, I will provide a brief synopsis of what happens in
the digression. At 172D3 Socrates begins to contrast those who spend their time in law
courts and those who engage in philosophical study. Lawyers, politicians, and orators do
not have the leisure to engage in truly free inquiry; instead, they conduct their
examinations under pressure from the water clock. Moreover, they are not free to follow
the path of the argument wherever it takes them, but must stay close to the heart of the
matter at hand. Philosophers, on the other hand, conduct their inquiries without concern
1A11 references to the Theaetetus are to F. M. Comford’s 1935 translation. Stephanus page references to
this dialogue w ill appear in the body o f the text The question o f precisely what form this critique o f
Protagoras takes is an interesting one. Indeed, one o f the purposes o f this paper is to try to get clear on this
very issue. A s w ill becom e clear, for many commentators the central question is whether or not Plato
succeeds in refitting Protagoras through strict, logical argument. For a commentator w ho believes that this
question is m isguided, see Edward N. Lee, ‘“ H oist with His Own Petard’ : Ironic and Com ic Elem ents in
Plato’s Critique o f Protagoras {Tht. 161-171)”, in Exegesis and Argument (ed. E. N . Lee, A. P. D .
M ourelatos, R. M. Rorty), Phronesis Suppl. V ol. 1,1973: Van Gorcum & Co. (A ssen, The Netherlands),
225-261. See esp. 256, n. 41.
2The precise placem ent o f the digression, I believe, should indicate that Plato himself thought it an integral
part o f his arguments against Protagoras. After all, it is “sandwiched” between the so-called peritrope and
the final arguments levied against Protagoras. A s I w ill make clear in what follow s, I think that this
placem ent has too often been m isunderstood, leading to the relative lack o f serious discussion o f the
digression within the secondary literature.
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for time. This absolute freedom of inquiry allows them to take up whatever topic arises.
Whereas the orator has a great need to keep up with the gossip of the m arketplaceknowledge of personal scandals can serve one well in a debate judged by the rabble, after
all—the philosopher does not even know the way to the marketplace. Of course, this
makes the philosopher appear foolish if ever he enters a law court. However, the orator
appears equally foolish if he is ever required to consider the nature of justice or kingship,
rather than particular matters of one person wronging another.
The digression comes to an end with Socrates discussing the right motive for
being virtuous and avoiding vice. Contrary to what is generally believed, the right
motive is not to have the appearance of a good person. Instead, the right reason for
taking the righteous path is that, in doing so, one is following the pattern of divine
happiness. All those who fail to follow this path live in an eternal state of godless
misery; such misery is brought about by the very lives they lead, where they find
themselves in constant association with others like them. If only they would agree to
submit their beliefs to an impartial examination, they would discover that they cannot
give a satisfactory account of them, and would become as silent as children.
A common mistake made in the literature on the Theaetetus is to ignore entirely
the presence of the digression.3 Kenneth M. Sayre, in Plato’s Analytic Method,4 makes
this mistake. Sayre includes an 80-page chapter on the Theaetetus in which the
digression is not mentioned at all. Indeed, in the entire book, only one passage from the
digression is cited, and that appears in Sayre’s chapter on the Sophist.5 This might be
understandable if Sayre were not focusing on the part of the dialogue which deals with
the critique of Protagoras.6 Yet, Sayre does take up this part of the dialogue. Sayre
works very hard to get clear on the precise form of the argument which immediately
precedes the digression, the peritrope, and argues that this argument is unsound.7
Moreover, Sayre offers some remarks on the argument which immediately follows the
digression.8 Highly conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the digression. We
should expect Sayre to provide some justification for ignoring this part of the dialogue,
yet none is forthcoming. As I will argue later, understanding the digression is essential to
understanding what Plato is doing with the Protagorean doctrine. As such, Sayre’s
discussion of this part of the dialogue is limited by its failure to take note of the
digression.
Another common approach to the digression is to acknowledge its presence, but
set it aside as a relatively insignificant rhetorical device. This is the tactic Robin
Waterfield employs in the critical essay attached to his translation of the dialogue.9
3There are even som e translators w ho leave this section o f the dialogue out entirely. This is the case with
Gwynneth M atthews’ translation in Plato ’s Epistemology, 1972: Faber & Faber (London).
4Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato ’s Analytic Method, 1969: U niversity o f Chicago Press (C hicago).

5Ibid., p. 179, n. 40 recalls the digression’s characterization o f the philosopher as a “free man” (Tht. 172D).
6This is the case with N icholas P. W hite’s Plato on Knowledge and. Reality, 1976: Hackett Publishing
Company (Indianapolis). Although W hite’s book contains a 40-page chapter on the Theaetetus, he is
m ostly concerned w ith the dialogue’s treatment o f the problem o f false belief.

7Ibid„ pp. 87-91.
sIbid., pp. 91-92. This argument turns on the expert’s ability to predict the future.
9Robin W aterfield (trans.), Theaetetus, 1987: Penguin Books (N ew York). See also Gilbert R yle, Plato’s
Progress, 1966: Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). R yle describes the digression as “long and
philosophically quite pointless” (p. 158).
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Plato pauses from hard argument against Protagoras and inserts a
few pages of glorious, impassioned writing contrasting the
mentality of philosophers with that of the worldly-wise...[A]s a
rhetorical passage, it needs little commentary: its merits are on the
surface.10
Later, Wateifield adds that the digression “stands on its own.”11 What could Waterfield,
and others like him, mean by this? We might begin to answer this question by focusing
on Waterfield’s claim that Plato “pauses” here from strict argument.12
The section immediately preceding the digression is one of the harder sections of
the dialogue to follow. Indeed, a considerable body of literature concerns the form of the
argument from 170A to 172C is. The success or failure of this argument turns heavily on
figuring out what form it takes; an invalid deductive argument does not prove anything.
Plato himself seems to have recognized that some defect has infected his argument; so
Socrates notes that, if he could, Protagoras “would expose me thoroughly for talking such
nonsense and you [Theodoras] for agreeing to it” (171D). With this comment in mind, all
the commentators who focus on finding the flaw, if any, in the argument preceding the
digression are certainly justified in their work. Moreover, when Socrates refers to the
immediately following pages as a “digression” (177C), it does seem natural to read the
intervening pages as a hiatus from strict argument.
However, the attitude implicit in Waterfield’s comments seems to be that the
digression is nothing more than Socrates’ way of entertaining the reader with a song and
dance. After being ran ragged by the difficult arguments of the preceding passages, the
story seems to go, the reader needs a break in order to catch her breath.13 And so
Socrates presents his caricatures of the orator and the philosopher. The commentators
who adopt this attitude to the digression fail to recognize that, behind Socrates’
caricatures, serious philosophical work is being done. Not only is Plato directing his
mouthpiece to comment on the characteristics representative of the orator and the
philosopher and of the situations in which each finds himself, but in doing so, he is
continuing his critique of the Protagorean position. The position for which I wish to
argue takes Socrates’ description of the passage from 172D-177C as a “digression” as
ironic. That is, contrary to the attitude which best explains the position taken by
commentators such as Waterfield, I propose that we take the digression very seriously,
and look for its merits well beneath the surface.
10Ibid., p. 177. Emphasis added.
n Ibid., p. 178.
12Although R a n d s M . Comford does not make this exact m istake, it is worth noting here one remark from
his treatment o f the Theaetetus ( Plato’s Theory o f Knowledge, 1957: N ew York (The library o f lib era l
Arts)). Com ford notes that at the end o f the digression, “ [t]he argument is now resumed” (p. 89). This
places Com ford squarely in the group o f commentators w ho, like W aterfield, believe that Plato uses the
digression to take a break from strict argument.
13There is another way o f interpreting the attitude which leads to ignoring the digression. Rather than
providing an opportunity for the reader to catch her breath, perhaps the digression is seen as Plato’s w ay of
signaling that a lot o f work needs to be done in order to understand the preceding arguments. Perhaps die
digression is placed at this point in the dialogue as Plato’s way o f saying to the reader, “If you want to try
to figure out that last argument (the peritrope), go right ahead. The dramatic action o f the dialogue w ill
continue, but you w ill not be m issing any important philosophical points.” A gain, I think that this way o f
reading the digression is equally flaw ed for failing to recognize the serious work which Socrates is doing in
this passage.
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A commentator who has realized the importance of the digression is Edward N.
Lee, who acknowledges that the digression “helps shed important light upon the purposes
and central ironies in the critique he [Plato] levels at Protagoras.”14 Moreover, Lee
indicates that he believes that any reading of the dialogue which fails to take into
consideration the points made in the digression is, at most, incomplete. This is a crucial
point about which I agree with Lee.15 However, the only use Lee makes of the digression
is to demonstrate how it relates to Plato’s earlier critique of Protagoras. To be fair, Lee
acknowledges die limited focus of his interpretation. He writes: “The present analysis
directs itself only to the ironic structure of..,161B-171D, but it is not at all my thesis that
these pages form any simply detachable unit or that they are discontinuous with the
remainder of the critique.”16 So Lee is to be given credit for not saying that the only
value the digression has is as an instrument for understanding the preceding arguments
against Protagoras. Still, it must be admitted that Lee does not do any work toward
establishing a reading of the digression in which it stands on its own, in which its value is
intrinsic rather than instrumental. Again, the absence of this work is excusable, given
Lee’s project. But it is this very absence which I wish to eliminate, in order to provide a
more complete account of the digression and its role in the critique of Protagoras. And so
I now turn to my own interpretation of the digression.
The digression is immediately preceded by Socrates speaking about extreme
conventionalism with respect to “right and wrong and in matters of religion” (172B).
People who adopt this sort of position affirm that justice and injustice, holiness and
unholiness, have no natural independent existence; rather, all that exists with respect to
these things is the common opinion, which becomes true as soon as it is enacted and
remains true as long as that opinion does not change. Given that much of the digression
concerns individuals who find themselves in places where decisions about such matters
are made, we should pause for a moment and try to figure out the connection Plato sees
between this topic and the overall epistemological critique of Protagoras. I believe Plato
14Lee, op. cit., p. 225.
I5I have m entioned this conviction o f m ine several times already, and so I think it is tim e for m e to say a
little m ore about it. It is not m y b elief that a reading o f the dialogue which fails to account for the
digression is, ipso facto, wrong. I do think that it is a legitim ate undertaking to try to figure out the logical
form o f the arguments H ato offers, determine if they are valid, and, if so, how credible the prem ises are.
To this extent, the question o f whether or not H ato succeeds in refuting die Protagorean doctrine is an
important one. (Here is one o f the points where I disagree with Lee ; see n. 1, above.) H owever, I think the
m istake such c om m entators m ake is believing that this is the only way to read the dialogue, and the only
question to ask. On the assum ption that Plato recognized that not everyone would be convinced by the
peritrope, coupled w ith Plato’s desire to point out all the w ays in which the Protagorean goes wrong, w e
should expect Plato to offer various reasons not to accept the Protagorean doctrine; those who would be
able to follow the lo g ic o f the peritrope, or at least get excited enough by it to try to figure out if it succeeds
or not, were not all the members o f Plato’s audience. M oreover, even among those who could follow the
argument there m ight be those who would resist the conclusion, viz., those disposed to accept the
Protagorean position. A s I w ill argue later. Hato believed, w ith good reason, that the m ost important
practical and m oral matters stand or fall w ith the rejection or acceptance o f the Protagorean doctrine. For
this reason, it w as extrem ely important to Plato to persuade as many people as he could not to be
Protagoreans. H ato was not w illing to let those people who could not follow the lo g ic o f the peritrope
becom e Protagoreans just because they could not follow that argument. Nor was he w illing to let those
generally suspicious o f that sort o f argument becom e (or remain) Protagoreans. A s such, it is equally
legitim ate to identify the reasons Plato offered to those people, and to evaluate them on their ow n terms. (I
guess the moral I w ish to draw from this is that the goals of, on the one hand, refuting Protagoras and, on
the other hand, convincing people not to be Protagoreans even if they do not see that the position is selfrefuting are not m utually exclusive.)
16L ee, op. cit., p. 255.
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recognizes at least two such connections. In the first place, the sort of conventionalism
mentioned at 172B is, as Comford puts it, “the extreme consequence of making man the
measure of all things”.17 Although Plato seems to have recognized that this position goes
beyond what the historical Protagoras held,18 it is not surprising that he would include it
here. In the process of examining a philosophical position, we often want to know what
consequences result from a consistent application of the principles constitutive of that
position. At times, such an investigation reveals consequences we reasonably find
unacceptable. Although this does not give us reason to reject the position under
investigation, it indicates that there is a need to appeal to some other principle in order to
block those consequences.19 In the process of compiling all the reasons to reject the
Protagorean doctrine, then, this move is methodologically sound.20
The second connection I believe Plato draws is more peculiar to Plato’s meta
philosophy. For Plato in particular, there is good reason to discuss matters political and
ethical while doing epistemology. For Plato, the answer to the question, “What is
knowledge?” has significant ethical ramifications.21 It is inseparably connected to the
answers to the questions, “What is virtue? ”, “Can virtue be taught?”, and “How ought I to
live my life?” To help see this, I think we need to remind ourselves that virtue is
identified with knowledge at Meno 88C-D and at Protagoras 361B-C. Further, we
should recall the triple role assigned to the Good-Itself in Republic VI and VII.22 Not
only is the Good-Itself the pinnacle of Plato’s ethics, but it is also the capstone of his
ontology and the supreme object of knowledge.23 With this background in mind, it
becomes somewhat easier to see why we are led into a discussion of ethics and politics in
the middle of the investigation into the nature of knowledge in the Theaetetus. If
Protagoras’s relativistic doctrine—even in its most extreme form—is the correct account of

17Com ford, op. cit., p. 83.
18A t 172C, he calls the adherents to this position “those who do not argue altogether as Protagoras does”.
That this position goes beyond what the historical Protagoras maintained can be seen from what Socrates
says at both 166C -167D andl71E -172A . In both cases, Socrates attributes to Protagoras—in the earlier
passage, going so far to put the words in Protagoras’s mouth, were he able to com e back from the dead and
defend him self—the position that, though all decisions in these sorts o f matters are true, som e are better than
others. Extreme conventionalists o f the sort described at 172B reject this final claim ; for th an , there is no
basis for m aking any such judgment.
19 H ato often uses this strategy. For just one exam ple, see the Mnaidos objection to C allicles’ hedonism at

Gorg. 494B -495C .
20 A t the end o f the paper, I w ill return to this issue and connect the points against Protagoras made here
with those m ade elsew here in the overall critique.
21I am tempted to say som ething quite a bit stronger here. It alm ost seem s as if, for H ato, the question,
“What is know ledge?” is itself an ethical question. Nowadays, it is commonplace to (logically) distinguish
between questions m etaphysical, epistem ological, and ethical. It is not clear to what extent Plato
recognized these distinctions. However, I do not think anything o f any great w eight turns on this in the
present discussion.
22See especially 505A -B , 509B -C , and 516B-517C .
recognize that these remarks w ill be contested by many interpreters o f Plato. N ot only are they a
controversial reading o f Books VI-VII o f the Republic, but they also ignore substantive questions
concerning the evolution o f Plato’s thought between the writing o f the Republic and that o f the Theaetetus.
Whether or not m y reading is correct, I remain convinced that Plato held onto his system atic approach until
at least this stage in his career.
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knowledge, disaster results in matters of ethics and politics. This, I believe, is the point
of placing the digression in the middle of the critique of Protagoras.
Early in the digression, Plato has Socrates give a characterization of the orator,
and of the situations in which the orator is most likely to be found.
The orator is always talking against time, hurried on by the clock;
there is no space to enlarge upon any subject he chooses, but the
adversary stands over him ready to recite a schedule of the points
to which he must confine himself. He is a slave disputing about a
fellow slave before a master sitting in judgment with some definite
plea in his hand, and the issue is never indifferent, but his personal
concerns are always at stake, sometimes even his life. (172E)
From this description, it is clear that Plato is talking about the law courts. The Theaetetus
is filled with images of legal proceedings, from the earliest pages—at 145C Socrates tells
Theaetetus that “we don’t want [Theodoras] to have to give evidence on oath”
concerning the youth’s character—to this middle section of the dialogue, to the famous
“jury” passage from 201A-C--the point of which is to show that the methods of inquiry
demanded by such proceedings are incompatible with knowledge acquisition—to the final
image of the dialogue at 210D, where we see Socrates going to meet the charges which
have been brought against him. In all of these images the tone is decidedly negative. I
would suggest that this is so in every case for two reasons.24 First of all, when charges
were brought against an individual, both the charged individual and the person bringing
the charges would have to make a written statement which strictly limited the range of
points admissible during the legal procedure. Moreover, during the trial each side would
have a fixed amount of time to make his points. In this way, the orator was not “free” to
explore other issues, nor was he able to investigate completely issues from within the
permitted range. Given these limitations, and given the interests at stake (“personal
concerns..., sometimes even his life”) it would not be unusual for the truth of the matter
to be lost in the shuffle. Instead, the primary concern became convincing the jury to
believe your side of the story over your adversary’s. To succeed at this task, it was
extremely useful to have at one’s disposal the skills of rhetoric. That this is so may be
reinforced by Plato’s second point against the legal system.
In the law court, once each side has had a chance to make its case, the matter is
turned over to the jury. Each member of the jury is given a vote, and what the jury
decides is the ruling on the matter. In other words, the jury is treated as the measure of
the matter. Regardless of what really happened in the case at hand, regardless of the
actual guilt or innocence of the accused, as far as society is concerned, what the jury says
is the truth. Given this situation, Plato believes it is absolutely essential to be skilled in
rhetoric in this setting. With the jury as the measure, there is no necessary connection
between the facts of the case and the verdict. What is more important is the ability to
manipulate the jury members so that they accept your side of the story. In this way, Plato
sees the entire jury system as a product of a Protagorean way of thinking.
Plato is highly critical of this situation. He describes the man able to succeed in
this environment as
narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship in slavery has dwarfed
and twisted his growth and robbed him of his free spirit, driving
him into devious ways, threatening him with fears and dangers
24In what follow s I w ill lim it my discussion to proceedings within the law courts. H ow ever, I take it that
m ost o f m y points are equally applicable to the sort o f debates which took place in the A ssem bly or even
the marketplace.
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which the tenderness of youth could not face with truth and
honesty; so, turning from the first to lies and the requital of wrong
with wrong, warped and stunted, he passes from youth to manhood
with no soundness in him... (173A-B)
Plato’s first criticism of the extreme Protagorean in the digression, while not explicitly
directed at the man-measure doctrine, does have as its ultimate target that doctrine. Plato
is critical of the legal system and its institutions for “warping” the minds of its
participants. Given that juries were often comprised of hundreds of people, and that
debates in the popular assembly were often attended by thousands of citizens, these
participants would have included virtually everyone with Athenian citizenship. What
Plato sees, then, is a connection between the Athenian legal system and the declining
health of the average Athenian’s soul. Rather than allowing its citizens to develop fully,
it leaves them in a grotesquely deformed state. They do not know how to conduct an
inquiry the goal of which is truth; they do not know how to give free range to their
thoughts and take the kind of perspective needed to see the connections among a large
variety of concepts. Instead, the sole purpose of conducting an inquiry is to prevail over
your opponent, and to win public honors for having done so. Given the connection we
have seen between these institutions and the man-measure doctrine, I will call this
warped state of the soul the Protagorean deformation.25
To see further why Plato would be concerned about this, it will be useful to recall
one of the most famous parts of Socrates’ defense. It is especially appropriate to do so in
this context, given the overall dramatic setting of the Theaetetus. Toward the close of his
defense, Socrates says:
“...I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my
usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet:
Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with
the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not
ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation,
and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought
to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?”...I shall
reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most
important things and greater importance to inferior things...I go
around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among
you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as
strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you:
“Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings
about wealth and all other public and private blessings for men.”26
For Plato, as for Socrates, the most important matters have to do with the state of one’s
soul. The state of one’s soul is not determined by the acquisition of external goods; an
25 There are many interesting connections between this line o f thought and several points m ade in the
Gorgias. Although there is not space to explore these fully, I w ill briefly m ention one. In the closing pages
o f the Gorgias, Socrates describes for C allicles the process o f judging souls before they enter either the
Isles o f the B lessed or Tartarus. A t 525A Socrates characterizes those souls bound for Tartarus as “deeply
scarred,... tw isted by lies and im postures, crooked because [they have] received no nourishment from truth”
(Helm bold translation). In the overall context o f the discussion with C allicles, it is clear that the sort o f
individual being described is one who lives a life o f impunity and who uses rhetoric solely for the purpose
o f flattering others, “whether the few or the many” ( Gorg. 527C ).

2eApol. 29D -30B. Grube translation.
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individual who amasses great wealth and receives many public honors does not
necessarily have a healthy soul. Just as Socrates found the level of psychic sickness high
among the Athenians who focused their energy on possessing wealth and power instead
of wisdom and truth, so Plato found the souls of the Athenians to be deformed.
Moreover, Plato criticizes those who capitalize on the needs brought about by this
system and its institutions. To return to the passage from 173A-B quoted above, we
should remind ourselves that Plato relates the deformation of the average Athenian’s soul
to some sort of “apprenticeship”. By implication, then, there is a second individual—or
group of individuals—being discussed. This individual, whoever it is, is responsible for
the training of those Athenians who were able to succeed in the law courts through their
use of rhetoric. We have already seen the relationship between institutions such as the
law courts and Protagoras’s measure doctrine. Although Protagoras claimed to be a
teacher of virtue or excellence, it is clear that he also taught rhetoric.27 There is a strong
connection between his relativism and rhetoric. If all impressions are true for the
individual who has them, then whenever there is an issue to be settled by the jury, there
are no independent “facts” to which one can appeal. If there are no such facts, then the
only way to get the members of the jury to adopt the position one is advocating is to
make it seem the most salutary of their options. The ways to do that, of course, are the
area of expertise of the teacher of rhetoric.
At this point in the digression, at Theodorus’s insistence,28 Socrates offers a
contrasting picture of the philosopher. In highly exaggerated terms, Socrates paints a
picture of an entirely other-worldly ascetic. The true philosopher never finds himself in
any place where people are wont to gossip. He has no concerns with the affairs of his
neighbors. Rather than concerning himself with matters of this world, he turns his
attention to the heavens, and tries to discover the true nature of everything.29 Of course
this characterization is exaggerated.30 However, what emerges from it is a picture of the
philosopher completely contrary to the product of the Protagorean deformation. We are
told that the true philosophers “never hear a decree read out or look at the text of a law”
(173D). The philosopher has no need to pay attention to such mundane things. After all,
it is the philosopher who recognizes that there is a universal law which is the true
governor of man’s actions. What one man, or one assembly of men, decrees to be the law
does not thereby gain any special power over the actions of humankind. In this way, the
true philosopher recognizes that man is certainly not the measure of all things.
In contrast, those who offer such decrees, and those who stop to listen to them and
to read the text of the conventional law, are the same people who worry about the gossip
of the marketplace and who judge their neighbors on the basis of their ancestry.
Although these people may not recognize the Protagorean foundation of their actions,
their actions are certainly grounded in some sort of Protagorean principle. They believe
that the decree of the assembly becomes the law to which they are beholden simply
because men have said so. They believe the tales told in the marketplace and at social
27See, for exam ple, DK 80B6b.
28By quite a com ic turn, Plato has Theodoras here say: “[W ]e are not the servants o f the argument, which
must stand and w ait for the moment when w e choose to pursue this or that topic to a conclusion” (173C).
If my reading o f the digression as itself part o f the argument against Protagoras is correct, w e m ust take
Theodoras’s remark about the argument being put on hold as ironic. For those w ho hesitate to attribute to
Theodoras the sophistication needed to recognize this, I offer that Plato has allow ed Theodoras to
unwittingly make this ironic comment.
29Quite literally in Thales’ case, as we are reminded at 174A.
30One is here reminded o f the “common” perception o f the philosopher as “u seless” at Rep. 487D , or o f
Aristophanes’ portrait o f Socrates’ “school” in Clouds.
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dinners, and alter their relations accordingly.31 To use Plato’s metaphor, they never seek
“the true nature of everything as a whole,” choosing instead to sink “to what lies close at
hand” (174A).
As Plato sees it, these are also the people who dominate Athenian society.
Athenian democracy and law courts encourage and embrace Protagorean relativism,
whether they realize it or not. This situation spells trouble for the philosopher, whose
complete lack of concern for this world plays to his disadvantage when he is thrust into a
situation in which “he is forced to talk about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes”
(174C). In particular, if the philosopher finds himself in a law court, facing charges
brought against him by one of the rabble, he will have no hope of convincing a jury of his
innocence. For Plato, exposing this situation for what it is and trying to initiate some
push for reform is a matter of the greatest urgency.
I think we are now in a position to see what the argument of the digression is.
After presenting it in its most general form, I will make some brief remarks about it
before returning to the rest of the digression, and to the question of the digression’s
placement in the overall critique of Protagoras’s doctrine.
Pr. 1—If the acceptance of a philosophical position produces bad
consequences in important matters, then it ought to be
rejected.
Pr. 2—Acceptance of the Protagorean measure doctrine
produces bad consequences in important political and
______ethical matters.
C- - The Protagorean measure doctrine ought to be rejected.
We have already reviewed a bit of Plato’s support for the second premise. There are at
least two areas in which acceptance of the Protagorean doctrine produces bad
consequences: it warps the “spirit” of the average Athenian, and it leads to injustice in
the legal system.
That Plato would endorse the first premise of this argument I take to be generally
clear. I have already provided some reason for believing this. For Plato, there are very
close connections among epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues; this seems to
be one of the key ideas expressed by placing the Good-Itself at the pinnacle of his
ontology. What is needed, however, is some reason to think that this premise is at work
in the digression. At first glance, there is not any. Still, we have already seen that we can
be grossly misled about the digression if we rely on initial appearances. With that in
mind, I propose that we can find the first premise within the text of the digression.
As I mentioned earlier in my brief synopsis of the digression, the final movement
of the passage concerns the right motive for being righteous. Rather quickly, Socrates
rejects the common idea that the right motive is to “seem innocent and good” (176B). In
the absence of genuine goodness, the mere semblance of goodness is insufficient when it
comes to what is really important.32 While it is true that the semblance of goodness is
often enough to avoid penalties in this life,33 the absence of righteousness in the soul
brings a penalty which “cannot be escaped” (176E). This penalty is an earth-bound life
31Qnce again w e are reminded o f Socrates’ trial at this point. The effects o f gossip are what Socrates
labels the “old charges” stApol. 18B-E. Socrates also recognizes that these effects w ill be the hardest to
overcome.
32Note that this common idea, which equates seem ing good with being good, itself bears a close
connection to Protagoras’s measure doctrine.
33These are the “stripes and death” referred to at 176D/E.
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of “godless misery,” devoid of all hope of entering the realm of divine happiness (176E177A). For our purposes, what is crucial to note about this is that it is an argument for
rejecting the common conception. The reasons for rejecting it point out that those who
accept the common conception will be eternally miserable. More generally, acceptance
of tins conception produces bad consequences in an important matter. If this is an
accurate reading of the closing of the digression, then, for the argument to have any
merit, Plato must be employing our Pr. 1.
Given the dramatic setting of the dialogue, Plato forces us to confront the reality
of the situation. The general acceptance of the Protagorean doctrine leads to the greatest
injustices, not the least of which is Socrates’ execution. Plato, then, is trying to compile
all the reasons not to accept the Protagorean measure doctrine. He has already tried to
demonstrate that the Protagorean position is self-refuting. On the assumption that this
argument would not persuade everyone not to accept that position, Plato continued to
offer arguments against accepting it. By turning his attention to the extreme
conventionalism of the digression, and the unacceptable consequences that result from
accepting it, he is pointing out the need modify the position by appealing to other
principles.34 Once the digression is complete, Socrates and Theodoras return to a more
moderate version of the Protagorean position in which qualitative differences among
judgments are spelled out in terms of experts and their ability to make reliable predictions
about the future. Socrates then proceeds to argue that the principle invoked here is not
consistent with the measure doctrine.35 If these are the only, or the most appealing, ways
to spell out the Protagorean position, then Plato has succeeded in eliminating the
Protagorean position from the table of viable alternatives, and in setting the stage for
discovering the true nature of knowledge, virtue, and justice. Finally, Plato is not guilty
of employing the same tactics for which he criticizes Protagoras, for the brand of
persuasion he employs is “beautiful, a genuine attempt to make the souls of [his] fellows
as excellent as may be. ”36’37

34Andrew Barker, in ‘T h e D igression in the Theaetetus”, Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 14 (1976),
457-462, refers to the argument o f the digression as “popular” as opposed to “philosophical” (p. 462).
Barker considers the argument to be focused on the different sorts o f subjects discussed by the orator and
the philosopher : whereas the orator discusses particular local conventions only, the philosopher discusses
universal moral natures. Barker then criticizes the argument for the “com m on-sense assumption” on which
it rests (p. 462). I have tw o points to make, one against Barker’s interpretation, and one in favor o f m y
own. A gainst Barker it can be noted that he fails to draw the connection betw een the man-measure doctrine
and the institutions which give it license. In favor o f m y interpretation, it can be noted that it does not rest
on any “com m on-sense assum ption”.
35 See 177C5-179D1 for this argument.

36Gorg. 503A.
37An earlier version o f this paper was read at the 21st Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference sponsored
by the Graduate Philosophy Organization o f the U niversity o f Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Matt
Johnston provided com m ents. I would like to thank die Philosophy Department o f the University o f
Rochester for supporting m y research on this project Eva Cadavid, Catherine M cKeen, David M erli, and
Greg W heeler forced me to work through several o f the broader issues involved in this paper, especially the
way in w hich I see the digression fitting within Plato’s overall critique o f Protagoras. Finally, Deborah
Modrak and Randall Curren have provided many valuable insights and criticism s as m y thoughts on this
issue have developed.

